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matter which is known as express matter," the court says- it is not there
averred nor shown by the testimony that any railroad in the United
States has ever held itself out as a common carrier of express companies,
i. e., a common carrier of common carriers. Much stress is laid on the
inconveniences that would follow, were the railroad companies obliged
to furnish express facilities to all applying for them, its interference
with passenger business, etc., and the conclusion is reached, that "The
railroad company performs its whole duty to the public at large and to
each individual when it affords the public all reasonable express accom-
modations. If this is done, the railroad company owes no duty to the
public as to the particular agencies it shall select for that purpose. The
public require the carriage, but the company may choose its own appro-
priate means of carriage, always provided they are such as to insure
reasonable promptness and security."
Failing to find any evidence of a usage to that effect, in the absence
of any statute, the cour6 declares that it is not the duty of railroad com-
panies to furnish express facilities to all alike who demand them; and
as no duty was imposed by contract upon the defendants to furnish the
complainants with such, the court declines- making a judicial regulation
of their business.
The opinion is of value because of the decision reached, rather than
for the discussion of the subject, which has been more elaborately
treated in many other cases, a collection of which will be found in a note
to Southern Ex. Co. v. Nashville l y. Co., 20 Am. L. Reg. 602.
The practical solution of the problem is not free from difficulty. The
growing feeling against monopolies of every sort, will no doubt lead to
attempts on the part of the various state legislatures to impose on the
railway companies, the duty which it has just been decided is not
theirs by the common law, and the complicated provisions, inseparable
from such legislation, will no doubt give rise to many constitutional
questions, akin to those we may expect from the Railroad Commission
Acts.
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SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES.1
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.2
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.3
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.4
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND 6
AGENT. See Bank.
Authority to Warrant-Presumption.-An agent, upon whom general
authority to sell, is conferred, will be presumed to have authority to
warrant, unless the contrary appears: Talmage v. Bierlouse, 103 Ind.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term, 1885. The cases will probably appear in 116 U. S. Rep.
2 From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter; to appearin 73 or 74 Ga. Rep.
3 From John W. Kern, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 103 Ind. Rep.
4 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 114 111. Rep.
6 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 64 Md. Rep.
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It will be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that
a warranty is not an unusual incident to a sale by an agent for a dealer
in a commodity, where the thing sold is not present and subject to the
inspection of the purchaser : Id.
Though the authority of the agent be restricted by instructions from
his principal, the latter will be bound by a warranty attending a sale by
Tie agent, unless the purchaser knew of such restriction: Id.
ATTACHMENT. See Bank.
BANK.
Garnishment-(ecks drawn before Servica-Lien to secure Endorse-
ments-Fraud- Conflict of Laws.-Where a depositor in a bank, before
the service of process upon the bank as garnishee at the suit of a cred-
itor of the deposit or, drew acheck in favor of another, which was for-
warded to the bank, and was by it paid in due course of business after
the service of the writ, and charged to the account of the depositor,
it was held, that the bank, as garnishee, was entitled to credit for the
amount of the check so paid: Bank of America v. Indiana Banking
Co., 114 Ill.
But if a bank pays checks drawn on it after it is served with gar-
nishee process, it cannot be allowed credit therefor as against the rights
of creditors of the depositor, entitled to share in the funds garnished:
Id.
Where a depositor indorsed a promissory note of a third person, made
payable to his order, and discounted the same in a bank where he had
funds to his credit, it was held, that a payment of the amount due on
such note by the indorser, to the bank, out of his funds on deposit, after
the service of garnishee process upon the bank at the suit of a creditor
of such indorser, could not be allowed the bank as a set-off, the indors-
er's liability to the bank being that only of a surety, and contingent : Id.
If a depositor draws a check upon his banker, who has funds to an
amount equal or greater, it operates to transfer the sum named in the
check to the payee, who may sue for and recover the same in his own
name: Id.
The fact that a check is drawn by a depositor of funds in a bank, in
favor of the cashier of such bank, just previous to the service upon the
bank, by garnishee process, is not of itself evidence of fraud or want of
good faith. It is as lawful for an attachment debtor to draw his check
in favor of the garnishee, as in favor of any one else, if done in good
faith before the service of process, and the garnishee will be entitled to
credit for the amount named in the check, in the absence of evidence
impeaching the transaction for fraud : Id.
A check drawn by a depositor in the state of Indiana, on his banker,
payable in this state, will be construed by the laws of this state, and
operate to transfer the sum named therein in accordance with the laws
of this state, notwithstanding a different rule obtains in the other state : Id.
Authority of Cashler-Note-Evidence-Notfiee.-In a suit against a
firm of private bankers, upon a note given by their clerk and cashier for
money borrowed by him in the firm name and appropriated to his own
use, in which the cashier's authority to give the note is put in issue, evi-
dence of the custom of bankers at the place in which the defendants'
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bank was located, to borrow money on time, is proper, as tending !o
show that the borrowing of money wai within the scope of the ordinary
and customary business of the defendants: Crain v. .FMrst Nat. Bank
of Jacksonville, 114 Ill.
In the same suit it was held, a paper, directed to another and distant
bank, giving the signatures of persons authorized to sign for the defend-
ants, one of which was in the handwriting of the cashier and another
that of one of the defendants, was proper evidence as an admission of
the defendant signing the same, of the cashier's authority to bind the
defendants by the execution of a note in their firm name. And the fact
that the payee of the note did not act on the faith of such paper, though de-
tracting from its weight, did not render it irrelevant and improper : Id.
The giving as collateral security, by a cashier of a private bank, notes
of other persons, of over $5000, of his bank, to secure a note of that
amount given by him -in the name of his principals, with authority, on
maturity of the latter notes, to sell the collaterals at public or private
sale, with or without notice, and apply the proceeds to the payment of
the note given, is not of such a nature as to afford notice to the party
making the loan and taking the notes, of the cashier's want of authority
to execute the note for the bank, or of fraud in giving it: Id.
General or Special Deposit of Money-Insolvency-Yrust Funds.-
Upon a special deposit of money, a bank is merely a bailee, and is
bound according to the terms of the deposit; but on a general deposit
the money becomes the property of the bank, and the depositor's claim
on the bank is merely for a like amount: McLain v. Wallace, 103 Ind.
Upon the insolvency of a bank, its general depositors must be paid
pro rata: Id.
The addition of the word " clerk" to the name of a general depositor
does not make the deposit a special one, nordoes it change the liability
of the bank: i.
The rule that a trustee may follow trust property as long as it can be
traced, has no application in an action to recover money on general
deposit in a bank: Id.
Contract of Cashier-Misoppropriation of Funds-Notice.-A con-
tract between the cashier of a bank and defendant, whereby defendant
was to buy railroad stock for such cashier, was to give his note to the
bank for it, and deposit the stock as collateral security for the payment
of the same, and the cashier was to advance the money of the bank,,to
pay for the stock, was contrary to the rules of the bank, it amounted to
a misappropriation of the bank's funds, for which both the cashier and
defendant are liable: Savannah Bank and Trust Co. v. .Hartridge, 73
or 74 Ga.
The knowledge of the cashier in such a transaction, was not the
knowledge of the bank, and it was not bound thereby: Id.
Contract by President.-The president of a bank cannot make a valid
contract between it and a third party, acting in the capacity of agent for
such third party as well as for the bank: English v. Bank of Georgia,
73 or 74 Ga.
Where Coker, who was president of a bank, and English agreed with
the bank, in writing, to become guarantors for the safe return of certain
jewelry to the bank, by Sharpe, and by such return of the jewelry such
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agreement became abrogated, it was not subsequently revived as against
English, by a note of English to Coker, authorizing him to make any
arrangement with Sharpe, for Coker and English, by which Sharpe might
take the goods, which Coker might see proper to make, and an arrange-
ment by which Sharpe was allowed by Coker to take the goods, giving a
receipt to Coker and English therefor, and Coker bound himself ver-
bally to the bank, to be jointly responsible with English for their safe
return : 1d.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Forbearance to Sue-Estoppel--.Extension.-Where the holder of
a promissory note gratuitously permits it to run more than a year after
maturity, and then, upon the payment of a part of it by the maker, the
holder, at the request of the maker, and without losing any right or chang-
ing his situation, agrees to wait until the latter can collect money with
Which to discharge the balance, such maker is not estopped to set up a
defence then existing, or which might thereafter arise, of which neither
such maker nor the holder, had notice at the time of such agreement:
Henry v. Gilliland, 103 Ind.
To defeat the right to a clear defence to a note, not payable in bank,
in the hands of an assignee, on the ground of a subsequent contract to
pay in consideration of an extension of time,.the plaintiff must show a
contract of extension for a definite time, upon a valid consideration.
Performance of his part is not sufficient to bind the maker: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Negligence.- Contract Limiting Liability-Fixing of ralue.-A
common carrier, may by contract, limit his liability as an insurer, but
he can not thus relieve himself from the consequences of his own negli-
gence or fraud: Rosenfield v. Peoria, etc., Bly. Co., 103 Ind.
In order that a common carrier may, by fixing the value of goods
received for transportation, limit his liability, he must show that the
shipper had knowledge of such fixing of value and for a sufficient con-
sderation consented thereto, or that his statements and conduct justified
the carrier in so fixing the value: Id.
Contracts limiting the amount of recovery will be construed most
strictly against the carrier. The burden is upon the carrier to show any
claimed limitation upon its common-law liability: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Bank.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Telegraph.
Regulation of Commerce.- Occupation Tax on Sale of Products of
another State.-An act of a state legislature imposing a tax or duty
on persons who, not having their principal place of business within the
state, engage in the business of selling or of soliciting the sale of certain
described liquors to be shipped into the state, is unconstitutional, as dis-
criminating to the disadvantage of the products of other states, and in
effect, a regulation of inter.stdte commerce : Walling v. State of Michi-
gan, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
CONTEMPT.
Service of an OreTr to Show Cause upon an Attorney of Record.-A
New York corporation doing business in California, was required by the
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law of that state to designate a person upon whom process may be served.
A suitwas commenced against the corporation, which duly appeared by its
attorneys. An order was issued against it to show cause why it should
not be punished for contempt in disobeying an ex parte restraining order
issued immediately upon the bringing of the suit. The designated agent
of the company purposely kept himself out of the way of the officer to
avoid service of this order; and an order was entered that service be
made upon "the attorneys of record herein of said defendant." .eld,
that such service was valid: "Eureka Lake Company v. Yuba County,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
CONTRACT.
Construction-Rght of Buyer to pass upon Quality-Evidence.-A
contract for the sawing, and delivery to the purchaser, of lumber, pro-
viding that he should. measure the same when delivered, and that Ire
should measure and pay for only such as was absolutely clear, and suit-
able for a certain purpose, while it gives the buyer the right to measure
the lumber and pass upon its quality, does not make him the sole judge,
and his decision beyond review. In such case, he is bound to receive
and measure such of the lumber as complies with the contract, although
in his judgment it is not of the proper quality : Mulliner v. Bronson,
114 Ill.
In a suit upon a contract for the sawing and delivery of lumber to the
defendant at his yard in a city, containing a clause that defendant should
measure the same after its delivery, and take only such as was absolutely
clear and would work into tobacco boxes, there is no error in admitting
the testimony of witnesses who saw the lumber after itwas sawed, in the
timber, and when it was being shipped, to show its quality when deliv-
ered. If injured while being shipped, such fact might be shown : Id.
CORPORATION.
ffecessity of Acceptance of Charter within State creating it.-The
mere granting of a charter, it not appearing upon the face of the incor-
porating act or otherwise, that the named corporators had applied for it,
does not create a corporate body-there must be at least an acceptance
of the grant by a majority of the corporators before its corporate life and
existence can begin : Smith v. Silver Valley Min. Co., 64 Md.
Where there is nothing in the charter which dispenses with the
necessity of its acceptance, and of organization under it, by the corpo-
rators, and nothing which authorizes them, even if the grant of such
authority would in any case be valid, to do those acts in another state,
the charter will be held invalid in the absence of proof of accept-
ance: Jd.
A charter can be accepted and the corporation organized only within
the limits of the state creating it: and this rule should be applied and
enforced, when a proper case for its application arises, in the tribunals
of the state in which the unauthorized acts were done or the suit was
instituted, as well as by the courts of the incorporating state : Id.
Conflict of Laws-urisdiction of Courts as to Controversies relating
to Management.-The courts of Maryland will not interfere in contro-
versies relating only to the internal management of the affairs of a for-
eign corporation. Such controversies must be settled by the courts of
the state creating the corporation: North State Copper and Gold Min.
Co. v. ield, 64 Md.
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.7here the act of a foreign corporation affects one solely in his capacity
as a member of the corporation, such act may be said to relate to the
management of the internal affairs of the corporation ; but it is other-
wise where it affects his individual rights only : Id.
Tio Cororations using same ATame-Iyunction.-A bill by a domes-
tic corporation incorporated by the name of "Drummond Tobacco Com-
pany," to enjoin the incorporation of another company in the same city
by the name of" Drummond-Randle Tobacco Company," to engage in
the same business, will not be sustained unless it is shown, by such a
preponderance of evidence as to satisfy the mind of the chancellor, that
the incorporation of the second company under the name proposed will
injure the former company in its business : Drummond !bbacco Co. v.
Randle, 114 Ill.
So the use of any particular name by a corporation will not be enjoined
unless it is made to appear, from the evidence and by all the circum-
stances, the proposed use of the name will likely result in injury to the
complainant : Id.
DAMAGES. See United States Courts.
EQUITY. See Specific Performance.
EVIDENCE.
Expert-.Hypothetical Case.-Where a hypothetical case, covering
the leading facts testified to, and practically admitted, is stated to a wit-
ness sh.own to be an expert, his opinion, based on such hypothetical case,
is proper evidence: Lotz v. Scott, 123 Ind.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
Bequest for Lfe- Waste by Executor during Life-estate-Remedyi for
Remadcrman.-Where money is bequeathed to one for life, with
remainder to another, and the executor, or administrator with the will
annexed, has wasted or converted it to his own use, the remainderman
cannot sue the bond of such executor or administrator, during the lifetime
of the tenant for life: State v. Brown, 64 Md.
The remedy for the remainderman in such case, is to apply to the
Orphans' Court to order the executor to bring the money into court to
be safely invested, so that the tenant for life may receive the interest
during his life, and at his death the principal may be paid over to the
remainderman: Id.
Upon the neglect or refusal of the executor to comply with such order
the court will revoke his letters, and appoint an administrator de bonis
non, with the will annexed, and direct him to bring suit on the testa-
mentary bond of the recusant executor. Or the remainderman may pro-
ceed against such executor in a court of equity, and compel him to bring
the money into court for investment: Id.
Right of one E-xecutor to Maintain Bill against the Other.-An exe-
cutor or administrator cannot file a bill in equity against his co-executor
or co-administrator, in order to compel the latter to account for and pay
over to him certain claims alleged to be due from the defendant as debtor
to the estate of the deceased: Whiting v. Whiting, 64 Md.
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FRAUD. See Bank.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Lease.- Consideration.-Whete, as part of the consideration of the
sale and transfer of a lease, for ten years, of real estate, the assignee
agreed "to assume the covenants, and pay the rent agreed in said lease,"
such contract is not a promise to answer for the default of another, within
the Statute of Frauds, but is an independent undertaking, founded upon
a new and valuable consideration, for the benefit of a third person, and
is valid : Wolke v. Femin, 103 Ind.
INJUNCTION. See Corporation.
INSURANCE.
Assignment of Policy to Insurer as Collateral-Duty to pay Premiums
-Failure to give customary notice- Unreasonable Delay of lnsured.-It
would be the duty of -one insured to keep *alive his policy, assigned as
collateral security to the insuring company, by the payment of premiums,
just as much as if it had been so assigned to any third person: Grant
v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co., 73 or 74.Ga.
While the custom and usage in dealings between one insured and the
insuring company, such as in regard to personal notice to the insured by
the agent of the company at Savannah of the time when premiums
became due, become so much a part of the contract of insurance as to
require the company to keep it up, or to give notice before substituting
another mode, yet the insured must act with reasonable diligence, and
six months' delay to pay a premium for want of notice appears so
unreasonable as to show a purpose to abandon the policy and let it
lapse : Id. -
LEGACY.
Failure to put Property in Inventory-Rights of Legatee.-In an
action of ejectment by legatees to recover leasehold property specifically
bequeathd to them, it is not necessary to prove, in addition to the pro-
bate of the will, and the grant of letters testamentary, and the assent of
the executor to the legacy, that the property was included in the inven-
tory returned by the executor, and was distributed to the legatees by the
order of the Orphans' Court: Matthews v. Turner, 64 Md.
The entire personal estate ought to be returned in the inventory to
the Orphans' Court. But the title of a legatee to property specifically
bequeathed, does not depend upon the inventory returned by the exe-
cutor, nor does it necessarily depend upon the orders of the Orphans'
Court: Id.
LIBEL.
False Statement in A.ffidavit for want of Arret.-An action for libel
cannot be sustained for false charges of a crime, in an affidavit fbr a
warrant taken before a duly authorized and lawfully commissioned mag-
istrate, having jurisdiction of the offence for which the warrant issues:
Francis v. Wood, 73 or 74 Ga.
The only exception made is where an affidavit is sworn recklessly and
maliciously before a court, that has no jurisdiction in the matter, and no
power to entertain the proceedings: Id.
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The libeler m,-y be punished and the abuse repressed by a prosecu-
tion for perjury, the rebult of which is to make the libeller infamous if
he is convicted : Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Injury to Servant- Co-employees-Foreman.-Where a master dele-
gates duties which the law imposes upon him to an agent, the latter,
whatever his rank, in performing such duties acts as the master, and
for an injury to an employee caused by the negligence of such agent,
the master is liable: Capper v. Louisvile, &c., Ry. Co., 103 Ind.
A foreman, or other like agent, except where the master's duties are
delegated to him, is a fellow servant with those under his immediate
supervision, and for his negligence the master is not liable to a servant
engaged in the same general service : Id.
One engaged in the work of constructing and repairing tunnels upon
the line of a railroad, who is injured by being carried from one point to
another upon the line of the road, is a fellow servant with the engineer
and other persons in charge of-the train : Id.
MINES AND MINING.
Following Veins outside of the lines of the Surface Location-Definition
of " Vein, Lodge or Ledge."-The act of congress (Rev. Stat. § 2322)
gives to the owner of a mineral vein or lode, not only all that is covered
by the surface lines of his established claim, as those lines are extended
Nertically, but it gives him the right to possess and enjoy that lode
or vein by following it.when it passes outside of these vertial lines lat-
erally : Iron Silver Xining Co. v. Cheesman, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
18.5.
I he acts of congress use the words vein, lode or ledge, as embracing a
more or less continuous body of mineral, lying within a well-defined
baundary of other rock, in the mass within which it is found, or it may
be s-id to be a body of mineral, or a mineral body of rock within defined
boundaries in this general mass: Id.
A vein is by no means always a straight line, or of uniform dip or
thickness, or richness of mineral matter, throughout its course. The
cleft or fissure in which a vein is found may be narrowed or widened in
its course, and even closed for a few feet and then found further on,
and the mineral deposit may be diminished or totally suspended for a
short distance, but -if found again in the same course with the same min-
eral within that distance, its identity may be presumed : Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Nuisance-System of Drainage-Liablty therefor.-Though the
city, by its charter, has the right to establish a system of grading and
drainage, such grading and drainage must be done so that the same will
not prove a nuisance to the citizens, impairing the health of families,
etc., thereby rendering enjoyment of their property impossible ; other-
wise the city will be liable for damages : Smith v. City of Atlanta, 73 or
73 Ga.
The sewer in question, though dug in 1870, was and is under the con-
trol of the city; if it be a nuisance, the city has not abated it, no one else
could, and not having abated it the city may be said to have maintained
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it and kept it up, and it is thereby a continuing nuisance, for the main-
tenance of ivhich the city is liable 1d.
Governmental Duties-Principal and Agen---Respondeat Superior.
-Where the duties delegated to officers elected by public corporations,
are political or governmental, the relation of principal and agent does not
exist, and the maxim of respondeat superior does not govern: Summers
v. Board, 103 Ind.
Counties are instrumentalities of government, and are not liable for
injuries caused by the negligence of the commissioners in the selection
of an unskilful or incompetent physician for the care of the poor: Id.
Nuisance-" Coasting" on a Street -Passing of Ordinance-Lia-
bility of Municipality.-By sect. 40, of the act of 1878, chap. 484,
amending the charter of the city of Cumberland, it is provided
that the city council "may pass ordinances to remove all nuisances
and obstructions from-the streets, lanes and alleys within the limits
of the city ;" and "for the preservation of peace and good order,
securing persons and property from violence, danger or destruction."
The city council, by ordinance, sect. 5, chap. 13, of the city code,
prohibited, under the penalty of a fine, " any sport, play or exercise
that might produce bodily injury, or endanger property on any street,
square or alley within the city limits." In an action against the
mayor and city council -of Cumberland, to recover for injuries to the
plaintiff, caused by his being knocked down, while crossing one of
the streets of the city, by a sled on which a number of boys were coast-
ing on the snow, it was held, 1st. That the defendant was under an obli-
gation to exercise for the public good the powers conferred on it by its
charter to prevent nuisances and to protect persons and property; and
that this duty was not discharged by merely passing ordinances; a
vigorous effort must be made to enforce them. 2d. That the defendant
was bound to prevent the nuisance if it could do so by ordinary and
reasonable care and diligence; but if it did use this degree of care and
diligence, it discharged its duty, and was relieved from responsibility;
and a vigorous effort to enforce its ordinance on the subject would fulfil
its duty in this respect. 3d., That the question whether such effort was
made was one to be determined by the jury ; Taylor v. Mayor, &c., of
Cumberland, 64 Md.
.Negligence-Sidewalks-Notice.-It is the duty of a city to keep its
streets and sidewalks in a reasonable safe condition, so that they may be
passed over in safety both by day and by night, and for neglect in this
particular the city would be liable: Bdlamy v. City of Atlanta, 73 or
74 Ga.
If the defect causing an injury has existed for some time the city is
chargeable with notice of it. If the city could have ascertained the
defect its failure to do so is negligence, and its liability the same as if it
had notice, and a charge that the defect must be open and notorious, etc.,
is error : Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Common Carrier; Master and Servant; Municipal
Corporation; Railroad.
E xcavation "causing Pitfall upon Adjoining Lot-Parent and Child-
Contributory Negligence.-One who makes an excavation upon his lot in
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. a manner as to cause a pitfall upon an adjoining lot is liable, in the
:dbc.ice of contributory negligence, to one who resides upon the latter,
i.-r tnie death of his child caused by falling into such pit: Mayhew v.
6,'s 103 Ind.
Wlire one is suing for the death of his child alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of another, evidence that the plaintiff is poor,
:ad not able to employ any one other than his housekeeper to take care
i" his children, is not admissible upon the question of contributory neg-
li -noe : Id.
Where one knows of danger which threatens injury to himself or
ihosu to whom he is bound to afford protection, and he can by reasonable
exertion avert it, his negligent failure to do so will prevent a recovery : Id.
NUISANCE. See Municipal Corporation.
PARTNERSHIP. See Receiver.
hju7ction-lRecever-Eguity Practice.-Upon an application for a
receiver of a partnership the court does not determine the ques-
tions arising between the partners; the only question for considera-
tion being, whether, upon the facts disclosed, there is an apparent
Lece3sity for either an injunction, or a receiver, to protect the assets of
the partnership until the rights of the partners can be definitely deter-
LVd red upon full hearing of the case: Beflebozder v. Buck, 64 NId.
The question of the propriety of granting an injunction or of appoint-
ing a receiver, is not to be determined upon the allegations of the bill
aAUi e, but the averments of the answer are also to be considered : ld.
The interest of the defendants, as well as that of the complainant, must
be cna,;dcred in an application of this kind ; and where it is manifest that
*., grast the injunction and appoint a receiver as prayed, at that stage of
t',e .zetlement of the affairs of the partnership then nearly at the close,
would le attended with no substantial good to any of the parties con-
-crrn.-A. but would likely be attended with unnecessary trouble, per-
plexity and expense, if not with even more serious mischief to the real
i.nercats involved, the application will be denied : Id.
In such a case there must be sme clear breach of duty, or conduct
amounting to fraud, or the facts must be such as to show a real danger
to the partneiship assets thus confided to the administration of the
-ettling partner, by reason of insolvency or otherwise : Id.
PRACTICE.
Trial by the Court without a Jury-Effect of a Stipulation as to
what was Provea.-Under the stipulation in writing of the parties a
case was tried by a circuit court without a jury. The court entered a
judgment finding certain facts, and, as a conclusion of law, the issues
ioined for defendant. On the same day a stipulation was filed, signed
by the attorneys for the parties, by which it was agreed that on the trial
certain facts were "proved." Held, That the stipulation did not contain
any agreement as to the existence of any facts, but merely a statement
as to what the proof showed on the trial: and therefore as to any facts
stated in the stipulation to have been shown by proof at the trial, if they
were not contained in the special findings, the only conclusion could be
that the court did not find them to be facts; and that the case must be
adjudicated on the special findings alone: Tyre & Spring Works Co. v.
Bpauldng, S. G. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
RAILROAD. See Common Carrier.
-Neyligence-Sparks from Locomotive -Evidence -An action was
brought against a railroad company to recover damages resulting from a
fire alleged to have been occasioned by the engines and locomotives of
the defendant being negligently run and controlled on the line of its
road. The plaintiff offered only indirect proof that the fire was caused
by the engine of the defendant. The defendant then offered to prove
that among the farmers in that region it was a custom or usage to set fire
to the leaves and underbrush at that season, so as to improve the pas-
turage; and that annually, during many years before the defendant's road
was built, such fires had been started in that valley and the adjacent
mountains. .eld, That the evidence was inadmissible: Green Ridge
Co. v. Brinkman, 64 Md.
Where a railroad company is sued for damages resulting from a fire
communicated by the defendant's engine, proof that the fire so originated
creates the presumption of negligence, and the onus probandi is on the
defendant to show the contrary: Id.
The fact that the engine habitually scattered sparks to such an extent
as to endanger combustible material along the line of the road, is one
from which the jury may find negligence on the part of the defendant: Id.
RECEIVER. See Partnership.
Partnership-Distribution of Assets-Recovery of Judgment-Lien.
-The recovery of a judgment against partners after the appointment
of a receiver to take charge of the firm assets for the benefit of the firm
creditors generally, creates no lien against any property or funds of the
firm in the hands of the receiver. Such property or funds cannot be
levied on by an execution, or reached by garnishment, for the reason of
its being in the custody of the law: Jackso2i v. Lahee, 114 111.
A receiver was appointed on bill filed by one partner against the other
for the settlement and adjustment of the partnership accounts and the
payment of creditors of the firm, which was insolvent, and the court had
ordered notice to be given to all creditors to come in and prove their
debts before the master. It was held, that one of the creditors, by the
recovery of a judgment against the firm during the pendency of said
bill, and the filing of a creditor's bill on the same day that notice to
creditors was ordered, did not acquire any lien, upon the assets in the
hands of the receiver, or right to be preferred over other creditors-and
this more especially when such creditor proved his claim before the
master, and shared in the distribution of the funds in his hands : .d.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
How far affected by Stipulation for Penalty.-The more fact that a
contract stipulates for the payment of liquidated damages in case of
failure to perform, does not prevent a court of equity from decreeing a
specific performance: Lyman v. Gedney, 114 Ill..
It is only where the contract stipulates for one of two things in the
alternative-the performance of certain acts, or the payment of a certain
amount of money in lieu thereof-that equity will not decree a specific
performance of the first alternative: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SURETY.
Right to require Indemnity or further Security from Principal-
Right to Account.-A surety of a trustee cannot maintain a bill in equity
to require his principal to give other and additional securities upon his
bond given to secure the cestuis que trust, or counter security, and on his
failure to give such security have him removed : Ridgeway v. Potter,
114 Ill..
The contract created by law between a principal and surety is, that
the former shall refund to the latter whatever the surety has to pay for
him. The principal is under no legal duty to a surety to keep his co-
sureties in equal solvency as they were when they first became such, or to
keep any co-sureties to share in the liability: Id.
Courts of equity, in relief of sureties under apprehension of loss or
injury, have gone to the extent to allow the surety, after the debt has
become due, to file a bill to compel the principal to discharge the debt
for which the surety is responsible; and it has been said that a surety,
when the debt has become due, may come into equity and compel the
creditor to sue for and collect the debt from the principal : Id.
On bill by a surety on the bond of a trustee, against the trustee, to
compel him to render to the court a report of his acts, including his
receipts and disbursements, or his debits and credits, where the cestuis
gue trust are not made parties, there is no erroi in the court refusing to
pass upon the report and state the account, as such a statement of the
account would not conclude them ; Id.
TAX AND TAXATION.
Goods for Export-When Power to Tax same Ceases.-Goods
intended for export from the state of their production to a foreign coun-
try or to another state do not cease to be part of the general mass of the
property in the state of production, subject, as such, to taxation in the
usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common
carrier for transportation, or have been started upon such transportation
in a continuous route or journey; the carrying of them to the depot
where the journey is to commence is no part of that journey : Coe v.
.Erol, S. (. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
Property in Transit.-Where property is collected from one or more
points, by any means of transportation, and is awaiting the necessary
preparation and facilities for further transportation, it will be deemed to
be in transit while so detained, and not liable to taxation: Board, &c.,
v. Standard Oil Co., 103 Ind.
But where property is collected, even though it may be at the point
of final shipment, to await indefinitely the owner's pleasure or the rise
of markets, or to undergo a partial process of manufacture, or from any
other cause having no relation to the preparation for or facilities or
exigencies of transportation, it will be held to have acquired a situs,
making it subject to taxation : Id.
TELEGRAPH.
Failing to trkvsmit .lfessage to Point without the State-Statutory
Penalty- Constitutional Law-Delay in transmitting Messages-Evi-
dence-Burden of Proof-Prescribing a penalty against telegraph com-
panies for failing to transmit a message, is valid and constitutional,,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
whether the message is to a point within or without the limits of this
state: Western U Tel. Co. v. Ferris, 103 Ind.
Where the sender of the message proves that there was an unreason-
able delay, the burden of explaining the delay is upon the company: Id.
A delay of several hours in transmitting a message that only requires
from five to fifteen minutes for its transmission, shows a want of dili-
gence: Id.
Where the business of an office is such that one operator cannot
receive messages with reasonable promptness, it is the duty of the com-
pany to supply the required assistance: Id.
TORT. See United States Courts.
TauSTBE. See Surety.
Payment to-Accp ptance of Credit on his Individual Account.-Where
a trustee holds a note belonging to the trust estate, and receives in pay-
ment thereof, wholly or partially, a credit allowed to himself on his own
individual indebtedness, the payment is not, in behalf of the maker of
the note, a good payment to the trust estate ; although the trustee is
solvent at the time of such payment: Maynard v. Cleveland, 73 or 74
Ga.
UNITED STATES COURTS.
Jurisdiction- Tort-Measure of Damages-Judicial Discretion.-In
an action of trespass for seizing and taking personal property, colore officii,
with circumstances of aggravation and averment of special damage,
brought in Circuit Court United States, under act 3d March 1875, it is
error for the court to dismiss the suit on the ground that it did not, "really
and substantially," involve a dispute or controversy properly within its
jurisdiction, where the conclusion reached is founded on an opinion
deduced from the declaration filed that the damage complained of did not
exceed the sum of $500 and that, if the jury should render a verdict for
that amount, the court would set it aside as excessive : Berry v. Ed-
munds, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
The action being for tort and no precise rule of law fixing the recover-
able damages, it was the peculiar function of the jury to determine the
amount by their verdict; and in so doing they might have properly
inflicted punitive damages upon the defendant, having in view the enor-
mity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plain-
tiff; such a verdict should not be set aside " unless the court can clearly
see that the jury have committed some very gross and palpable error, or
have acted under some improper bias, influence or prejudice, or have
totally mistaken the rules by which the damages are to be regulated : Id.
Where it does not appear as matter of law from the nature of the
case, as stated in the pleadings, that there could not legally be a judg-
ment recovered for the amount necessary to give jurisdiction, the court,
in order to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction, must find, as a mat-
ter of fact, ipon evidence legally si~ftient, "that the amount of damages
stated in the declaration was colorable, and had been laid beyond the
amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of
creating a case :" Id.
The discretion given by sect. 5, act March 3d 1875, is judicial, pro-
ceeding upon ascertained facts according to rules of law, and subject to
review for apparent errors: Id.
